Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade by Saggi, Kamal & Yildiz, Halis Murat
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the
quest for global free trade
Saggi, Kamal and Yildiz, Halis Murat
Southern Methodist University, Ryerson University
30 June 2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17558/
MPRA Paper No. 17558, posted 28 Sep 2009 16:27 UTC
Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global
free trade
Kamal Saggiy and Halis Murat Yildizz
Abstract
We develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and
the nature (bilateral or multilateral) of trade liberalization are endogenously determined.
To determine whether and how bilateralism matters, we also analyze a scenario where
countries pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis. We nd that when
countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests
more than tari¤ revenue and consumer surplus, there exist circumstances where global
free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade
agreements. By contrast, under symmetry, both bilateralism and multilateralism yield
global free trade.
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1 Introduction
Global trade liberalization occurs through a variety of channels, not all of which appear to
be in harmony with one another. While practically every major nation is now a member
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a participant in its complex process of multi-
lateral trade liberalization, an average WTO member also belongs to six preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) (World Bank, 2005). The schizophrenic nature of todays multilateral
trading system is reected in the somewhat conicting rules of the WTOs key multilateral
trade agreement, i.e. the General Agreement for Tari¤s and Trade (GATT): while Article I of
GATT requires member countries to undertake trade liberalization on a most-favored-nation
(MFN) or non-discriminatory basis, Article XXIV of the very same agreement permits WTO
member countries to pursue PTAs under which participating countries grant tari¤ (and other
trade policy) concessions to each other that they do not have to extend to all member countries
of the WTO.1 This raises the following question: would GATT serve the cause of global free
trade more e¤ectively if it did not include the exception to MFN provided by Article XXIV?
In other words, would global free trade be easier to achieve if all WTO members were to
pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis? To address this issue, we develop an
equilibrium theory of trade agreements and use it to compare the pros and cons of bilateral
and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization.
We analyze the coalition proof (or stable) Nash equilibria of a game of trade liberalization
between three countries that di¤er with respect to their endowment levels. The game (which
we refer to as bilateralism) proceeds as follows. In the rst stage, each country announces the
names of its trading partner(s) with whom it wishes to sign a free trade agreement (FTA). An
FTA between two countries requires them to abolish tari¤s on each other and it arises i¤ they
both announce each others name. Next, given the world trade regime, countries choose their
tari¤s. Finally, international trade and consumption take place. After analyzing equilibrium
trade agreements under bilateralism, we examine the stable equilibria of this game under the
1While Article XXIV tries to limit the damage on non-member countries by requiring PTA members to not
raise tari¤s on outsiders, the fact remains that it contradicts the principle of non-discrimination that underlies
the entire WTO system.
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restriction that countries can liberalize trade on only a multilateral basis (we call this game
multilateralism). By comparing equilibrium outcomes under bilateralism with those under
multilateralism, we isolate the consequences of the exception to multilateral trade liberalization
available to WTO members under GATT Article XXIV.2 To the best of our knowledge, our
paper is the rst to provide such a comparison in a model in which both the nature and the
degree of trade liberalization are endogenously determined.
Consistent with actual WTO experience, under our multilateralism game a pair of countries
can engage in mutual trade liberalization so long as each of them extends their respective tari¤
reductions also to the third country  as mandated by the GATTs MFN clause.3 We nd
that the degree of trade liberalization undertaken by two countries (say i and j) under such
a multilateral trade agreement hfijmgi is lower relative to that under the bilateral free trade
agreement hfijgi. As a result, the non-participating country (i.e. k) actually faces lower
tari¤s in export markets under the bilateral FTA hfijgi relative to the multilateral trade
agreement hfijmgi. However, the non-member country faces discriminatory tari¤s in export
markets under hfijgi whereas no such discrimination exists under hfijmgi. Due to this crucial
di¤erence between the two types of trade agreements, in our model the non-member country
is worse o¤ under the bilateral FTA hfijgi relative to the multilateral agreement hfijmgi.
Equilibrium analysis reveals that when countries are symmetric with respect to their en-
dowment levels, global free trade is the only stable equilibrium under both bilateralism and
multilateralism. In other words, under symmetry, the freedom to pursue purely bilateral agree-
ments has no consequences at all insofar as the obtainment of global free trade is concerned.
This immediately raises the question whether this irrelevance result holds when the underlying
economic environment is asymmetric in some respects. To this end, we then analyze a scenario
where endowment levels are unequal across countries and nd that global free trade is stable
over a larger parameter space under bilateralism relative to multilateralism. This result has
a powerful and surprising implication: there exist circumstances where global free trade is a
2We do not consider unilateral trade liberalization since the presence of terms of trade considerations in our
model implies that such liberalization is not in any countrys interest.
3Note that in our model countries are free to sign a multilateral agreement even under bilateralism. By
contrast, the multilateralism game rules out a discriminatory bilateral FTA.
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stable equilibrium only if countries are free to form bilateral FTAs. Why? The logic is as
follows. While considering whether or not to participate in multilateral trade liberalization,
each country has to take into account its welfare under the trade regime that emerges in the
absence of its participation. Since a non-participating country (say k) is worse o¤ under the
bilateral FTA hfijgi relative to the multilateral agreement hfijmgi, each countrys incentive to
participate in multilateral trade liberalization is stronger when its non-participation results in
a discriminatory bilateral FTA between the other two countries as opposed to when it results
in a non-discriminatory multilateral agreement between them.4 In this way, the freedom to
pursue bilateral agreements can act as a force in favor of multilateral trade liberalization.5
Our results show that heterogeneity across countries may be an important determinant of
the potential for success of multilateralism and that bilateralism has a useful role to play in
the process of global trade liberalization. An important implication of our analysis is that
to properly account for the role of bilateralism, we need to better understand why countries
choose to enter into bilateral agreements when multilateral trade liberalization is an option.
In this context it is noteworthy that while both Krugman (1991) and Grossman and Helpman
(1995) noted that asymmetries across countries can play a crucial role in determining incentives
for bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization, existing literature has tended to pay little
attention to this issue. Indeed, in our model bilateral FTAs even fail to arise when countries
have symmetric endowments since, under such circumstances, countries nd it in their mutual
interest to go all the way to global free trade.
In a recent paper, Aghion et. al. (2007) examine a leading countrys choice between
sequential and multilateral bargaining of free trade agreements and provide a comparison of
these bargaining processes. While we consider similar issues, there are important di¤erences
4Since political economy considerations can potentially play an important role in determining incentives
for bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization, later in the paper (section 6) we consider a scenario where
governments put greater weight on producer interests relative to consumer surplus and tari¤ revenue. We
nd that the presence of such political economy motives actually enlarges the parameter space over which the
freedom to pursue bilateral trade agreements is necessary for achieving global free trade.
5Saggi and Yildiz (2006) consider cost di¤erences across countries in an oligopolistic model of intraindustry
trade and uncover similar results. See Levy (1997), Krishna (1998), and Ornelas (2005b) for analyses focusing
on political economy considerations.
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between their approach and ours. First, in our model, all countries are free to negotiate FTAs
and countries can form multiple bilateral FTAs. Second, under multilateralism, Aghion et
al. (2007) assume that countries have only a binary choice between global free trade and
no agreement whereas we permit two countries to undertake trade liberalization on an MFN
basis. In Aghion et al. (2007), when bilateral FTAs are forbidden (i.e. under their multilateral
bargaining protocol), any single country (say country k) can ensure that no agreement hfgi
prevails by simply opting to not practise free trade itself while such a country ends up facing
the multilateral agreement hfijmgi in our model. As a result, while the nature of coalition
externalities (i.e. whether they are negative or positive) shapes the choice between sequential
and multilateral bargaining and the circumstances under which global free trade obtains in
their model, the relative degree of the positive externality under the bilateral FTA hfijgi and
the multilateral agreement hfijmgi is the driving force behind our analysis. More specically,
while both hfijgi and hfijmgi generate a positive externality for the non-member by increasing
its welfare relative to the status quo, the degree of the positive externality is stronger under the
multilateral agreement hfijmgi. Finally, unlike Aghion et. al. (2007), we do not allow transfers
between di¤erent coalitions. This is important because when transfers are possible and global
free trade maximizes aggregate welfare, it necessarily emerges as the equilibrium under both
sequential and multilateral bargaining. When free trade does not maximize aggregate welfare,
Aghion et. al. (2007) nd that FTAs facilitate the achievement of global free trade i¤ they
create negative externalities for non-members. In our model, FTAs can have this e¤ect even
when free trade maximizes global welfare and FTAs generate a positive externality for the
non-member.
Our paper shares some key elements with Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Furusawa and Kon-
ishi (2007), both of which employ the network formation game developed by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) in examining whether or not a given trade conguration is pair-wise stable.6
Under symmetry, global free trade is also stable under their approach. Unlike, us however,
6Relative to our approach, the concept of pairwise stability implies two constraints. First, the deviating
coalition can contain at most two countries. Second, the deviation can consist of severing just one existing link
or forming one additional link. In order to eliminate these constraints, we follow Bernheim et al. (1987) and
use the concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium to isolate stable equilibria.
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they only examine whether the formation of bilateral FTAs results in global free trade as the
stable outcome and do not analyze the consequences of adopting a strictly multilateral ap-
proach to trade liberalization. The approach of this paper is also related to that of Riezman
(1999) who also asks whether bilateralism facilitates or hinders the achievement of global free
trade. However, while we analytically derive the stable Nash equilibria of a non-cooperative
game of FTA formation, Riezman (1999) uses the cooperative solution concept of the core and
illustrates his results via numerical examples. Second, our model allows us to focus on asym-
metries across countries in a way that cannot be done in Riezmans (1999) framework. The
relationship between preferential and multilateral liberalization has frequently been analyzed
in the literature in models of repeated interaction between countries  see Bagwell and Staiger
(1997), Bond et. al. (2001), Freund (2000), and Saggi (2006).7 We add value to this literature
by treating both bilateral and multilateral liberalization as endogenous.8
2 Underlying trade model
To endogenize the formation of trade agreements among asymmetric countries, we utilize an
appropriately adapted version of the partial equilibrium framework developed by Bagwell and
Staiger (1999). There are three countries: a; b; and c and three (non-numeraire) goods: A, B,
and C. Each countrys market is served by two competing exporters and I denotes the good
that corresponds to the upper case value of i. For example, if i = a then I = A. Country i is
endowed with zero units of good I and ei units of the other two goods where ea  eb  ec.
9
The demand for good z in country i is given by d(pzi ) =    p
z
i where z = A;B; or C.
As is well known, the above demand functions can be derived from a utility function of the
form U(cz) = u(cz) + w where czdenotes consumption of good z; w denotes the numeraire
good; and u(cz) is quadratic and additively separable in each of the three goods. Since each
7See Bhagwati et. al. (1999) for a collection of many of the important papers in the area.
8Note that while the joint welfare of members is often considered in determining whether or not a trade
agreement would arise (see, for example, Ornelas (2005a) and Krishna (1998)), much of the existing literature
on free trade agreements does not derive the equilibria of a game that fully species the process by which such
agreements arise.
9In addition, all countries have large enough endowments of the numeraire good w to ensure trade balance.
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country possesses only two goods while it demands all three, country i must import good I in
order to consume it and it can import it from either trading partner. For example, country a
imports good A from both countries b and c while it exports good B to country b and good C
to country c.
Let tij be the tari¤ imposed by country i on its imports of good I from country j. Ruling
out prohibitive tari¤s yields the following no-arbitrage conditions for good I:
pIi = p
I
j + tij = p
I
k + tik (1)
where i; j; k = a; b; c; and i 6= j 6= k. Let mIi be country is imports of good I. Since country i
has no endowment of good I, we have
mIi = d(p
I
i ) =   p
I
i (2)
Each countrys exports of a good must equal its endowment of that good minus its local
consumption:
xIj = ej   [  p
I
j ] (3)
Market clearing for good I requires that country is imports equal the total exports of the
other two countries:
mIi =
X
j 6=i
xIj (4)
Equations (1) through (4) imply that the equilibrium price of good I in country i equals:
pIi =
1
3
 
3 
X
j 6=i
ej +
X
j 6=i
tij
!
(5)
Using these prices, the volume of trade is easily calculated. As is clear from equation (5), the
price of good I in country i increases in its tari¤s and decreases in the endowment levels of
the other two countries. The e¤ect of a countrys tari¤ on its terms of trade is evident from
equation (5): only a third of a given increase in either of its tari¤s is passed on to domestic
6
consumers with exactly two third of the increase falling on the shoulders of foreign exporters.
By design the model examines country is trade protection towards only good I (i.e. the
only non-numeraire good that it imports). Since countries have asymmetric endowments,
under free trade country a faces the largest volume of imports of protected goods (it imports
(eb+ec)=3 units of good A) whereas country c faces the lowest volume of imports of such goods
(it imports (ea + eb)=3 units of good C).
10 Note also that country is imports of good I do
not equal its exports of other non-numeraire goods. For example, under free trade, country a
exports (2ea eb)=3 units of good C to country c and (2ea ec)=3 units of good B to country b
and the sum of these exports is lower than its total imports of good C: 0 < 4ea eb ec < eb+ec.
In order to balance trade, in addition to exporting goods B and C, country a exports the
numeraire good to both countries b and c. Similarly, country c imports the numeraire good
from both its trading partners.
From a welfare perspective, given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, it su¢ces to
consider only protected goods. A countrys welfare is dened as the sum of consumer surplus,
producer surplus, and tari¤ revenue over all such goods:
wi =
X
z
CSzi +
X
z
PSzi + TRi (6)
Using equations (1) through (5) one can easily obtain welfare of country i as a function of
endowment levels and tari¤s. Let aggregate world welfare be dened as the sum of each
countrys welfare: ww =
P
iwi.
We proceed as follows. First, we consider a three stage game of trade liberalization under
which each country is free to pursue either (a) no trade liberalization or (b) bilateral trade
liberalization or (c) multilateral trade liberalization.11 This game is meant to capture the var-
ious options regarding trade liberalization available to WTO members, option (b) being made
possible by GATT Article XXIV. After deriving Nash equilibria and isolating those equilibria
10The same ranking applies with respect to the value of imports so long as 3 > ea + eb + 2ec, which is a
minor condition that is assumed to hold.
11Since all countries have market power in our model, allowing for unilateral liberalization is not necessary:
no country will choose to pursue such liberalization in our model.
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that are stable (more on this below), we ask how equilibrium outcomes are a¤ected if countries
cannot pursue bilateral trade liberalization and must instead choose between multilateral trade
liberalization or no liberalization at all. This exercise allows to isolate the consequences of the
exception to MFN provided under GATT Article XXIV.
3 Endogenous trade agreements
We now describe our game of trade liberalization (which we refer to as bilateralism). In the rst
stage, each country simultaneously announces whether or not it wants to sign a free trade agree-
ment (FTA) with each of its trading partners. Country is announcement is denoted by i and
its strategy set 
i consists of four possible announcements: 
i = ff; g; fj; g; f; kg; fj; kgg,
where f; g denotes an announcement in favor of the status quo or no trade liberalization;
fj; g in favor of an FTA with only country j; f; kg in favor of an FTA with only country
k; and fj; kg in favor of FTAs with both of them (which is equivalent to announcing in favor
of multilateral free trade). This stage determines the underlying trade policy regime. Next,
given the policy regime, countries impose their optimal tari¤s. Finally, given trade agreements
and tari¤s, international trade and consumption take place.
The following trade policy regimes can emerge in the bilateralism game: (i) No agreement
or the status quo hfgi prevails when no two announcements match or the only matching
announcements are f; g; (ii) an FTA between countries i and j denoted by hfijgi is formed
i¤ countries i and j announce each others name ji and ij; (iii) two independent FTAs in
which i is the common member denoted by hfij; ikgi are formed i¤ (1) ji and ij and (2)
ki and ik; and (iv) free trade, denoted by hfFgi, obtains i¤ all countries announce each
others names: i.e. i = fj; kg for all i; j; k = a; b; c.
12
Before proceeding further, we clarify two expositional points. First, the regime hfij; ikgi
is a hub and spoke trading arrangement where the hub country (i.e. i) has an independent
FTA with each of the two spoke countries who do not have an FTA with each other. To
12In order to eliminate redundant announcements, we assume that each announcement costs " (where " > 0
is arbitrarily small).
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simplify notation, we denote hfij; ikgi as hfihgi (i.e. country i is hub). Second, while changes
in the underlying trade regime result from announcement deviations by countries, it proves
convenient to refer directly to regime changes rather than changes in announcements. For
example, when the bilateral FTA hfijgi is in place, the unilateral announcement deviation of
country i from fj; g to f; g alters the underlying trade regime from hfijgi to no agreement
hfgi and we refer to this announcement deviation of country i as simply a deviation from
hfijgi to hfgi.
Throughout the remainder of this section as well as section 4, we maintain the following
assumption:13
Assumption 1:
ei = e for all i = a; b; c: (symmetry)
Let country is welfare as a function of trade regime r be denoted by wi(r) where r 
fhfgi ; hfijgi ; hfjkgi ; hfihgi ; hfjhgi or hfFgig and i; j; k = a; b; c. Also, let wi(r   v)
denote the di¤erence between country is welfare under trade regimes r and v: wi(r   v) 
wi(r)  wi(v).
Since Article I of GATT forbids tari¤ discrimination, we assume that under the status quo,
each country imposes a non-discriminatory tari¤ on its trading partners: tij = tik = t

i for all
i; j; k = a; b; c. Country is optimal MFN tari¤ is easily calculated:
ti  Argmaxwi() =
e
4
(7)
If two countries form an FTA, they remove their tari¤s on each other and impose their optimal
external tari¤s on the non-member country: under hfijgi we have tij = tji = 0, tik = t
f
i and
tjk = t
f
j . The optimal external tari¤ of country i on the non-member country k is given by:
tfi  Argmaxwi(ij) =
e
11
(8)
13Calculations supporting the results reported in this section as well as the rest of the paper are contained
in the appendix.
9
Note that under symmetry, we have ti = t

j = t
 and tfi = t
f
j = t
f . As in Bagwell and Staiger
(1997, 1999), we nd that the formation of a bilateral FTA induces each member to lower
its tari¤ on the non-member country relative to the status quo (i.e. the model exhibits tari¤
complementarity): tf < t.14
Before deriving equilibrium agreements, we report a useful lemma that is easy to establish:
Lemma 1: Under symmetry, wj(ih  F ) < 0 < wi(ih  F ).
In other words, the hub country (i) of the hub and spoke agreement hfihgi is better o¤
relative to free trade hfFgi while each spoke country is worse o¤. Note that the hub country
i enjoys privileged access in both spoke countries under hfihgi since neither spoke imposes a
tari¤ on the hub whereas both impose the tari¤ tf on each other. As a result of this favorable
treatment, country i is strictly better o¤ under hfihgi relative to hfFgi. To see why the spokes
are worse o¤ under hfihgi relative to hfFgi, rst note that aggregate global welfare is strictly
higher under hfFgi relative to hfihgi. Since the hub is strictly better o¤ under hfihgi relative
to hfFgi and welfare of the two spoke countries is equal due to symmetry, both spokes must
be worse o¤ under hfihgi relative to hfFgi. In fact, each spoke country has an incentive to
revoke its FTA with the hub and become an outsider facing an FTA between the other two
countries: wj(ik   ih) > 0.
We are now ready to derive equilibrium trade agreements under bilateralism. To economize
space, we provide a rather condensed discussion of Nash equilibria. It is straightforward to
show that given Assumption 1, the status quo hfgi, a bilateral FTA hfijgi, and free trade
hfFgi are all Nash equilibria under bilateralism. The hub and spoke regime fails to be an
equilibrium because wj(ik   ih) > 0. A bilateral FTA hfijgi is a Nash equilibrium because
wi(ij   ) = wj(ij   ) > 0 (9)
14See Bagwell and Staiger (1997, 1999) and Saggi and Yildiz (2009) for a detailed discussion of the tari¤
complementarity e¤ect and Estevadeordal et. al. (2008) for empirical evidence in its support. It is worth
noting that tari¤ complementarity also arises in simple general equilibrium models of trade agreements such
as Bond et. al. (2004).
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i.e. a member country of a bilateral FTA has no unilateral incentive to break the agreement.15
Global free trade hfFgi is a Nash equilibrium because Lemma 1 implies that no country will
deviate to become a spoke and the deviation to become a non-member facing an FTA is ruled
out because
wi(F   jk) > 0 (10)
To deal with the multiplicity problem and to capture the process of FTA formation in a
more realistic fashion, we now isolate Nash equilibria that are coalition proof or stable (as in
Dutta and Mutuswami, 1997).16 We begin by considering the potential stability of free trade
hfFgi. Given Lemma 1, we need to consider only two joint deviations from free trade:
(JF1): Deviation of i and j from hfFgi to hfijgi.
(JF2): Deviation of i and j from hfFgi to hfgi.
Deviation JF1 can be ruled out because, under symmetry, no two countries have a joint
incentive to exclude the third country from free trade:
wi(F   ij) > 0 (11)
Finally, it is immediate from (9) and (11) that the three countries have no incentive to deviate
jointly from hfFgi to hfgi so that JF2 is ruled out. In fact, this inequality also implies that
hfgi is not a stable Nash equilibrium since the joint deviation of countries i and j from hfgi
to hfijgi is self-enforcing: both countries benet from this joint deviation and it is immune to
further unilateral deviations by virtue of the fact that hfijgi is a Nash equilibrium. By similar
logic, it is easy to see that hfijgi also fails to be stable since the joint deviation of all three
countries to hfFgi is self-enforcing. Thus, we have shown the following:
Proposition 1: Given symmetry, free trade hfFgi is the only stable trade agreement under
15Due to the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect, the formation of an FTA generates a positive externality for the
non-member: wk(ij   ) > 0.
16Following Bernheim et. al. (1987), a coalitional deviation is self-enforcing if a proper subset of players in
the deviating coalition have no incentive to undertake a further deviation. Note that an alternative approach
would have been to use the notion of a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE). However, the use of CPNE is more
appealing since a SNE must be immune to any joint deviations, even those that are not self-enforcing.
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bilateralism.
It is worth noting that the above result also obtains under the network formation game
of Goyal and Joshi (2006) under which countries pursue only bilateral trade agreements. In-
terestingly, Goyal and Joshi (2006) interpret this result as establishing the compatibility of
bilateralism and free trade. As we shall see below, by providing a comparison of bilateralism
and multilateralism our model suggests an alternative interpretation of this result.
We now analyze a scenario where any trade liberalization undertaken by countries must be
multilateral or non-discriminatory in nature. This analysis helps assess how the prospects of
attaining global free trade are a¤ected if countries cannot form bilateral FTAs that, by their
very nature, discriminate against the non-member country.
4 Endogenous agreements under multilateralism
Under a multilateral approach to trade liberalization (or simply multilateralism), the strategy
set of country i is 
i = f;Mg, j 6= k 6= i. In other words, each country announces either in
favor of or against multilateral trade liberalization. If all three countries announce in favor,
they choose the jointly optimal set of tari¤s which, in our model, are equal to zero. Thus, a
multilateral agreement in which all countries participate necessarily leads to global free trade.
If only two countries (say i and j) announce in favor of multilateralism, they jointly choose
their optimal tari¤s subject to the constraint that they must not discriminate against country
k  i.e. in accordance with the MFN clause of the WTO, any tari¤ cut undertaken by either
country i or j must apply to imports from both its trading partners. Formally, countries i
and j sign the multilateral agreement hfijmgi when individual country announcements are as
follows: i = M , j = M , k = . Finally, note that if two (or more) countries announce
against multilateralism, the status quo hfgi prevails under which each country imposes its
individually optimal MFN tari¤ on every other country.
If countries i and j agree to sign the multilateral agreement hfijmgi they choose the tari¤
12
pair (tmi , t
m
j ) to solve
(tmi ; t
m
j )  Argmax [wi(ij
m) + wj(ij
m)] (12)
Under symmetry, tmi = t
m
j = t
m and this jointly optimal MFN tari¤ tm is given by:
tm =
e
7
where tm < t =
e
4
(13)
Since tm < t, it is immediate that under the multilateral agreement hfijmgi countries i
and j lower their tari¤s on each other as well as on the non-participating country (i.e. k). This
result implies that under hfijmgi country k benets from the multilateral trade liberalization
undertaken by the other two countries without having to o¤er any liberalization in return since
it retains its individually optimal MFN tari¤ t on countries i and j. Furthermore, it is worth
emphasizing that country k faces lower tari¤s in export markets when the other two countries
implement the bilateral FTA hfijgi relative to when they sign the multilateral agreement
hfijmgi, i.e., tf < tm. In other words, the degree of trade liberalization undertaken by two
countries is lower when they sign the multilateral agreement hfijmgi than when they sign the
bilateral agreement hfijgi: t  tm < t  tf . Despite this, the welfare of the non-member
country (k) is higher under hfijmgi compared to hfijgi: wk(ij) < wk(ij
m). This is because
the non-member is subject to discriminatory treatment in each members market under the
bilateral FTA hfijgi: while countries i and j face zero tari¤s in each others market under
hfijgi, country k faces the tari¤ tf . By contrast, such discriminatory treatment is absent under
hfijmgi since trade liberalization undertaken by countries i and j is extended to country k
on an MFN basis. As we will show below, this fundamental di¤erence between bilateral and
multilateral trade liberalization plays a crucial role in our analysis.
As under bilateralism, it is straightforward that the status quo hfgi is also a Nash equi-
librium under multilateralism. Furthermore, hfijmgi is not a Nash equilibrium because the
outside country (k) actually benets from joining the agreement hfijmgi thereby converting it
to hfFgi:
wk(F   ij
m) > 0 (14)
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The above inequality also implies that no country has a unilateral incentive to deviate from
free trade. Thus, under symmetry, free trade hfFgi is also a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,
since all three countries benet from a joint deviation from the status quo to free trade (from
which there are no further coalitional deviations), we have:
Proposition 2: Given symmetry, free trade hfFgi is the only stable agreement under
multilateralism.17
A comparison of Propositions 1 and 2 shows that when countries are symmetric, multilat-
eralism is su¢cient to reach global free trade. One interpretation of this result is that if the
move from the status quo to global free trade were to confer equal gains upon all countries
(which is what happens when countries have symmetric endowments), nothing would be lost
by forsaking the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs since such agreements would not even arise
in equilibrium. Does this imply that bilateralism is irrelevant for the ultimate objective of
achieving global free trade? Or are there circumstances under which the quest for global free
trade is a¤ected in a material way by the freedom (or the lack of it) to pursue bilateral FTAs?
We show next that when endowment levels are asymmetric across countries, bilateral FTAs
can not only arise in equilibrium but the freedom to sign such agreements can be necessary
for achieving multilateral free trade.
5 Trade liberalization under asymmetry
From hereon, we drop the assumption that endowment levels are symmetric across countries.
In what follows, the size of a country is measured by its endowment of non-numeraire/protected
goods relative to others. In this context, it is worth recalling that each countrys endowment
of the (unique) good it imports is zero and that asymmetry in endowments translates directly
into asymmetries of volume of exports. In other words, an increase in a countrys endowment
in this model increases its exports of non-numeraire/protected goods without increasing its
imports of such goods (since the model is partial equilibrium in nature and lacks any income
17In fact, we can show that under symmetry global free trade is the unique strong Nash equilibrium under
both bilateralism and multilateralism.
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e¤ects). Indeed, since the country with the largest endowment of non-numeraire goods faces
relatively smaller suppliers, its imports of such goods are the smallest. It is worth emphasizing
that in our model no country is a price taker on world markets  in fact each country is the
unique importer of a single good and therefore has market power that it can exploit via a tari¤.
We next derive optimal tari¤s under each regime under asymmetry.
5.1 Optimal tari¤s
Country is optimal non-discriminatory (or MFN) tari¤ is given by:
ti  Argmaxwi() =
ej + ek
8
(15)
Note that a countrys MFN tari¤ increases with the endowments of its trading partners. Similar
to (8), when countries i and j form a bilateral FTA hfijgi, they abolish tari¤s on each other
and choose their external tari¤s independently. We have
tfi  Argmaxwi(ij) =
5ek   4ej
11
and tfj  Argmaxwj(ij) =
5ek   4ei
11
(16)
It is easy to see that the external tari¤ of an FTA member increases with the endowment of the
non-member whereas it decreases with that of its FTA partner.18 Similarly, a comparison of ti
and tfi implies that the magnitude of the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect increases with the size
of partner countrys endowment whereas it decreases with the endowment of the non-member
country. To guarantee that all tari¤s are positive and non-prohibitive, given (16) we assume
that minfei; ej; ekg 
4
5
maxfei; ej; ekg.
Finally, under the multilateral agreement hfijmgi countries i and j choose the tari¤ pair
(tmi , t
m
j ) to maximize wi(ij
m) + wj(ij
m). We have
tmi =
2ek   ej
7
and tmj =
2ek   ei
7
(17)
18It is obvious that the same optimal tari¤ obtains for a spoke country under a hub and spoke trading regime.
By contrast, since the hub has an FTA with both spokes, it practices free trade.
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5.2 Incentives for bilateral trade liberalization
How does a countrys incentive to form a bilateral FTA with another depend on the distribution
of endowments across countries? We address this key question by breaking it up into parts
and stating three related lemmas:19
Lemma 2a: Let country j be an FTA partner of country i under regime r but not under
regime v and let the status of country k be the same under both regimes (i.e. either it is a
partner of country i under both regimes or not). Then, the following holds: @wi(r v)
@ej
 0 
@wi(r v)
@ei
.
The intuition underlying the @wi(r v)
@ei
 0 is as follows. Due to the smaller volume of
their exports, countries with smaller endowments benet less from tari¤ reductions granted
by others. Similarly, such countries have relatively more to lose from eliminating their own
optimal tari¤s since these tari¤s apply to relatively larger import volumes (or to relatively
inelastic export supply curves). Thus, a countrys willingness to enter into a bilateral trade
agreement with another depends positively on its own endowment.
A similar intuition underlies the other inequality (i.e. @wi(r v)
@ej
 0). The smaller the
endowment of a countrys partner, the larger the increase in its export surplus from the elimi-
nation of its partners optimal tari¤ and the smaller the loss due to its own trade liberalization
since the tari¤ reduction applies to a smaller volume of imports (due to the smaller size of its
partner). The two inequalities reported in Lemma 2a imply that a country prefers to form a
bilateral FTA with the smaller of its two trading partners:
wi(ij)  wi(ik) i¤ ek  ej: (18)
How does the endowment level of a competing exporter, denoted by k, a¤ect the incentive
of country i to form a bilateral FTA with country j?
Lemma 2b: Let country j be an FTA partner of country i under regime r but not under
regime v and let the status of country k be the same under both regimes (i.e. either it is a
19Welfare levels under all possible regimes are reported in the appendix and these can be used to prove
Lemma 2a through Lemma 4.
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partner of country i under both regimes or not). Then,
(i) @wi(r v)
@ek
 0 if country k is an FTA partner of country j under regimes r and v;
whereas
(ii) @wi(r v)
@ek
 0 if country k is not an FTA partner of country j under regimes r and v.
The rst part of the above lemma captures the idea that when country k is already an FTA
partner of country j, country is welfare gain from a bilateral FTA with country j decreases
with the endowment of country k. Why is this true? Recall that both countries i and k export
the same good to country j (i.e. they are competing exporters). When country k already
enjoys free access to country js market, the larger is country ks endowment the smaller the
increase in country is export surplus that results from the trade liberalization undertaken by
country j. The intuition behind part (ii) of the lemma is analogous  when its rival exporter
(i.e. country k) is not an FTA partner of country j, the strategic advantage gained by country
i in country js market from signing the bilateral FTA hfijgi increases in country ks size,
making the FTA more valuable from its perspective.
The following lemma examines the welfare implications of being a hub country (say i under
hfihgi) relative to other trade regimes:
Lemma 3: wi(ih) > maxfwi(ij), wi(F ); wi()g for all i; j = a; b; c.
The fact that hub country prefers hfihgi) to hfFgi informs us that the rst part of Lemma
1 generalizes to the case of asymmetric endowments. The intuition is the same as that under
symmetry: relative to free trade, the hub country enjoys privileged access in both spoke
countries. One implication of this lemma is worth stressing: a hub country has no incentive
to unilaterally revoke either one or both of its FTAs.
5.3 Multilateral trade liberalization
How do the incentives of a country to form (or join to) a multilateral agreement depend on
the underlying endowment structure?
Lemma 4: Under multilateralism, the following hold:
(i) @wi(ij
m )
@ei
> 0, @wi(ij
m )
@ej
< 0 and @wi(ij
m )
@ek
< 0; and
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(ii) @wi(F ij
m)
@ei
> 0, @wi(F ij
m)
@ej
< 0 and @wi(F ij
m)
@ek
< 0.
The intuition underlying all of the inequalities reported in Lemma 4 is quite analogous to
that which underlies parallel results under bilateralism with only one exception  i.e. whereas
@wi(ij )
@ek
> 0 under bilateralism when country k is a non-member country, the opposite is true
under multilateralism, i.e., @wi(ij
m )
@ek
< 0. To see why this is the case recall that under the
multilateral agreement hfijgim, countries i and j lower their tari¤s on not only to each other
but also on country k whereas under the bilateral agreement hfijgi they only lower tari¤s
on each other. The larger is country ks endowment, the smaller the increase in the export
surplus that countries i and j obtain due to the multilateral agreement hfijmgi since their
rival exporter (i.e. country k) captures a larger share of their markets.
5.4 Equilibrium trade agreements under asymmetry
To highlight the crucial role played by asymmetry, it proves instructive to consider a scenario
where two countries (denoted by l and l0) have larger endowments than the third (denoted by s;
refereed to as the smaller country).20 Accordingly, let the pattern of endowment asymmetry
be given by:21
Assumption 2a:
es =
e

< el = el0 = e and 1   
5
4
(19)
To avoid redundancy, we focus directly on stable agreements under bilateralism. First
consider the perspective of the two larger countries. We know from Lemma 1 that spoke
countries are worse o¤ relative to free trade under symmetry. Similarly, Lemma 2a and Lemma
2b imply that @wl(F l
0h)
@es
 0 and @wl(F sh)
@es
 0. Thus, a larger country (say l) under free
20As noted earlier, in our model no country is small in the traditional sense since all three can inuence
their terms of trade. Hence we use the word smaller as opposed to small.
21An earlier version of the paper also analyzed the case where es = es0 =
e

< el = e and
5
4
  > 1. To save
space, we omit a detailed discussion here and simply note that analogous results hold under this alternative
type of asymmetry.
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trade has no incentive to revoke one of its FTAs and become a spoke:
wl(F   sh) > 0 and wl(F   l
0h) > 0 for all  (20)
Similarly, we know from (10) that under symmetry, starting from global free trade a country
has no incentive to unilaterally revoke its two FTAs. Lemma 2a and Lemma 2b reinforce this
result for the larger countries under asymmetry. We have:
@wl(F   sl
0)
@es
=
@wl(F   sh)
@es| {z }
0
+
@wl(sh  sl
0)
@es| {z }
0
 0 (21)
Therefore, a larger country (say l) prefers hfFgi to hfsl0gi:
wl(F   sl
0) > 0 for all  (22)
Thus, inequalities (20) and (22) show that a larger country has no unilateral incentive to defect
from free trade.
It is immediate from (20) that a joint defection from free trade to any hub and spoke regime
does not occur. This implies we only need to consider three possible joint defections from free
trade:
(JF1): Joint deviation of l and s from hfFgi to hfslgi.
(JF2): Joint deviation of l and l0 from hfFgi to hfll0gi.
(JF3): Joint deviation of l and s or l and l0 or all countries from hfFgi to hfgi.
We know from inequality (11) that under symmetry ( = 1) no two countries benet from
excluding the third country from free trade. Furthermore, we show in the appendix that
wl(F  sl) is monotonically decreasing in  and that wl(F  sl) > 0 at the smallest possible
endowment of country s (i.e. at  = 5
4
) . This implies that joint deviation JF1 cannot occur:
wl(F   sl) > 0 for all . It is immediate from this and inequality (18) that the two larger
countries have no incentive to jointly deviate from hfFgi to hfll0gi: wl(F   ll
0) > 0 for all
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. Therefore, joint deviation JF2 is also ruled out. Finally, the fact that wl(F   sl) > 0
together with inequalities (9) and Lemma 2a implies that joint deviation JF3 also does not
occur: wl(F   ) > 0 for all . Thus, we have shown the following:
Lemma 5: Suppose Assumption 2a holds. Then, there exist no unilateral or coalitional
deviations of larger countries from free trade.
Lemma 5 suggests that the stability of global free trade depends critically upon the pref-
erences of the smaller country. Let i(r   v) denote the critical threshold at which country i
is indi¤erent between regimes r and v. Direct calculations yield
ws(F   ll
0)  0 i¤   s(F   ll
0) and ws(F   lh)  0 i¤   s(F   lh) (23)
where we show in the appendix that s(F   ll
0) < s(F   lh). Together with (23), this implies
that free trade is stable i¤   s(F   ll
0). What happens when  > s(F   ll
0)? Parts (ii)
and (iii) of the following proposition (proved in the appendix) addresses this question:
Proposition 3a: Given Assumption 2a, the following hold under bilateralism:
(i) hfFgi is uniquely stable when   s(F   ll
0);
(ii) both hfslgi and hfll0gi are stable when s(F   ll
0)    l0(lh  sl); and
(iii) hfll0gi is uniquely stable when   s(F   ll
0).
 Figure 1here 
Proposition 3a relates the degree of underlying asymmetry to the nature of stable agree-
ments. Part (i) simply says that if the degree of endowment asymmetry is su¢ciently small,
free trade is uniquely stable. This implies that Proposition 1 does not require symmetry but
rather that the degree of endowment asymmetry be su¢ciently small. Part (ii) says that if
the degree of endowment asymmetry is moderate, both a bilateral trade agreement between a
smaller and a larger country and a bilateral FTA between the two larger countries are stable
whereas part (iii) says that if the degree of endowment asymmetry is su¢ciently large, only
an FTA between the two larger countries is stable  in such a situation, the smaller country
20
prefers being a non-member to participating in multilateral free trade.22
It is noteworthy that multiple stable equilibria obtain when the degree of endowment asym-
metry is moderate  i.e. when s(F   ll
0)    l0(lh   sl). Since theory o¤ers no guidance
about which of these equilibria might be observed, we examine both of these possibilities
hereafter.
6 When, why, and how bilateralism matters
To see how the ability to form bilateral FTAs matters, suppose countries were to follow only
a multilateral approach to trade liberalization. Under such an approach, there are only stable
equilibria: hfslmgi and


fll0
m
g

. To see why, rst note that Lemma 5 implies that there can
be no coalitional deviations from hfFgi to hfgi. Furthermore, Lemma 4 implies that the
larger country l0 has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from hfFgi to hfslmgi. This implies
that hfslmgi is not stable. In fact, the only deviation from free trade that we need to consider
is the unilateral deviation of the smaller country from hfFgi to


fll0
m
g

. It turns out that this
deviation does not occur if the degree of endowment asymmetry is small enough:
ws(F   ll
0m)  0 i¤   s(F   ll
0m) (24)
It immediately follows that free trade is stable under multilateralism when   s(F   ll
0m).
What if  > s(F   ll
0m)? We know that wl(ll
0m   ) > 0 under symmetry ( = 1). Since
@wl(ll
0
m
 )
@es
< 0 (Lemma 4) we have
wl(ll
0m   ) > 0 for all  (25)
Inequalities (24) and (25) imply that the multilateral agreement


fll0
m
g

is stable when  >
s(F   ll
0m).
22A similar result obtains in Ludema (2002) where asymmetry takes the form of transportation costs as
opposed to endowments.
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Proposition 3b: Given Assumption 2a, hfFgi is stable when   s(F   ll
0m). Otherwise

fll0
m
g

is stable.
Figure 2 shows stable agreements under multilateralism.
 Figure 2 here
Recall that under bilateralism, global free trade is stable only when   s(F   ll
0) whereas
it is stable under multilateralism only when   s(F   ll
0m). A straightforward comparison
of these critical thresholds delivers one of our major results:
Proposition 4: Given Assumption 2a, the following hold:
(i) s(F   ll
0m) < s(F   ll
0); and
(ii) over the parameter range s(F   ll
0m) <   s(F   ll
0) the unique stable agreement
under bilateralism is hfFgi whereas under multilateralism it is


fll0
m
g

.
 Figure 3 here
Part (i) of proposition 4 says that free trade is stable over a larger parameter space when
countries are free to sign bilateral FTAs relative to when they cannot. Part (ii) demonstrates
that there exist circumstances where the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs is necessary for
achieving global free trade. This happens because the smaller country has a greater incentive
to choose global free trade under bilateralism due to the fact that it is discriminated against
its rival exporter in each larger member countrys market under the bilateral FTA hfll0gi
whereas it su¤ers no such disadvantage under the multilateral agreement hfll0mgi  i.e. opting
out of global free trade is relatively costlier for the smaller country under bilateralism. It is
noteworthy that this result obtains even though the smaller country faces lower tari¤s in its
export markets under the bilateral FTA between the two larger countries hfll0gi relative to that
under the multilateral agreement


fll0
m
g

. Thus, if the degree of endowment asymmetry is not
too large, the threat of a bilateral FTA between the two larger countries and the discrimination
that is inherent to such a trade agreement can be necessary to nudge the smaller country to
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announce in favor of global free trade. The very fact that the multilateral agreement is non-
discriminatory in nature makes it less e¤ective in altering the trade-o¤ facing the smaller
country since it does not lose as much from opting out of global free trade.23
When  > s(F   ll
0), global free trade fails to obtain under both bilateralism and multi-
lateralism. Intuitively, if the smaller country is su¢ciently small, then even the possibility of a
bilateral FTA between the two larger countries is not enough to induce it to opt for global free
trade. When such is the case, one possible way forward is to ask how global welfare compares
under the equilibrium agreements that obtain under bilateralism and multilateralism. From
Proposition 3b we know that under bilateralism both hfll0gi and hfslgi are stable agreements
when s(F   ll
0) <   l0(lh   sl) whereas hfll
0gi is uniquely stable when  > l0(lh   sl).
Furthermore, Proposition 3b says that when global free trade does not obtain under multi-
lateralism,


fll0
m
g

emerges as the unique stable equilibrium. Thus, when  > s(F   ll
0),
we need to consider two possible scenarios: (1) hfll0gi is stable or (2) hfslgi is stable. First,
consider scenario (1) and note that lower internal and external tari¤s (thus freer trade) obtain
under hfll0gi relative to


fll0
m
g

: tml > t
f
l . Thus, larger trade volumes and higher aggregate
world welfare obtain under hfll0gi relative to


fll0
m
g

: ww(ll0   ll0
m
) > 0.
Now consider scenario (2) where hfslgi is the stable bilateral agreement. We show in the
appendix that ww(sl  ll0
m
) > 0 when s(F   ll
0) <  < l0(lh  sl). In other words, over the
relevant parameter range, global welfare is higher under the bilateral agreement hfslgi relative
to the multilateral agreement


fll0
m
g

. Thus, when free trade is out of reach, the option to
pursue bilateral FTAs can yield welfare-improving trade liberalization that is foregone under
a strictly multilateral approach.24
23It is worth noting here that the result reported in part (i) of Proposition 4 depends crucially on the fact
that, relative to the status quo, the degree of the positive externality enjoyed by the non-member is stronger
under the multilateral agreement


fll0
m
g

relative to the bilateral FTA hfll0gi. In an alternative model, the
relative strength of this positive externality under the two types of agreements might be reversed. And if so,
the incentives for participating in global free trade could be stronger when discriminatory bilateral agreements
are not permitted.
24Of course, aggregate world welfare does not necessarily speak to the fate of individual countries. It is
immediate form (24) that, when the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs is necessary for achieving global free
trade, large countries are better o¤ under bilateralism relative to multilateralism whereas the small countrys
fate is the opposite.
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7 Political economy considerations
In order to determine whether and how the presence of political economy considerations a¤ects
our main results, suppose countries put additional weight on producer surplus relative to tari¤
revenue and consumer surplus:
wi =
X
z
CSzi + TRi + (1 + )
X
z
PSzi (26)
Since the model lacks an import competing industry, the additional weight on producer surplus
(i.e. ) has no e¤ect on the tari¤s countries implement under no agreement and a bilateral
FTA. As a result, domestic surplus stays unchanged under the bilateralism game. However,
by increasing the importance of the export surplus gain that results from trade liberalization
undertaken by partner countries, the additional weight on producer surplus makes participation
in FTAs more desirable.
On the other hand, under the multilateral agreement hfijmgi countries i and j internalize
each others additional weights on export prots and their respective MFN tari¤s fall with :
tmi =
2ek   (1 + 3)ej
7
and tmj =
2ek   (1 + 3)ei
7
(27)
As before, to guarantee that all tari¤s are non-negative, we assume that (i) minfei; ej; ekg 
4
5
maxfei; ej; ekg and (ii)  
1
5
. For the case of symmetric endowments, we prove the following
result in the appendix:
Proposition 5: Given symmetric endowments ( ei = e for all i), the following hold:
(i) hfFgi is uniquely stable under bilateralism for all  whereas
(ii) hfFgi is uniquely stable under multilateralism only when   1
10
. Otherwise, hfijmgi
is the stable equilibrium.
Thus, provided that the degree of political economy pressure is not too small (i.e.  > 1
10
),
the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs can be necessary for achieving global free trade even when
countries have symmetric endowments. To understand the intuition behind this result, consider
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the perspective of the outside country (i.e. country k) under hfijmgi: under multilateralism,
the higher the weight on producer surplus, the lower the tari¤s faced by the outside country
in its export markets. As a result, the incentive to opt out of multilateral trade liberalization
increases with the degree of political economy pressure . By contrast, such a result does
not obtain when the agreement involved is a bilateral FTA since the external tari¤s of FTA
members are independent of the degree of political economy pressure faced by them.
Now suppose that countries have asymmetric endowments. Let the pattern of endowment
asymmetry be given by Assumption 2 and two countries (denoted by l and l0) have larger
endowments than the third (denoted by s). As before, let pi (r v) denote the critical threshold
at which country i is indi¤erent between regimes r and v, where pi (r  v) is now a function of
.
It is straightforward to show that Lemma 5 continues to hold under bilateralism  i.e. the
two larger countries do not deviate either unilaterally or coalitionally from free trade. Thus,
once again, the stability of free trade depends critically upon the unilateral preferences of the
smaller country. Direct calculations establish that:
ws(F   ll
0)  0 i¤   ps(F   ll
0) and ws(F   lh)  0 i¤   
p
s(F   lh) (28)
where ps(F   ll
0) < ps(F   lh) for all . Therefore, free trade is stable under bilateralism i¤
  ps(F   ll
0).
Similarly, under multilateralism, while the larger countries have no incentive to opt out of
free trade, the smaller country benets from deviating unilaterally from hfFgi to


fll0
m
g

if
the degree of endowment asymmetry is large enough: ws(F   ll
0m)  0 i¤   ps(F   ll
0m).
It follows that free trade is stable under multilateralism when   ps(F   ll
0m). We prove the
following result in the appendix:
Proposition 6: Given Assumption 2, the following hold:
(i) ps(F   ll
0m) < ps(F   ll
0) for all ;
(ii) over the parameter range ps(F   ll
0m) <   ps(F   ll
0), bilateralism yields hfFgi as
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the stable equilibrium whereas multilateralism yields


fll0
m
g

;
(iii) when  > ps(F   ll
0), multilateralism yields


fll0
m
g

as the stable equilibrium whereas
bilateralism yields hfll0gi and also hfslgi when in addition   pl0(lh  sl) and
(iv) world welfare is higher under bilateralism relative to multilateralism for all .
Proposition 6 provides a conrmation of our key insight that a country that is reluctant to
liberalize has a greater incentive to opt out of global free trade under multilateralism relative
to bilateralism. Moreover, this insight receives even stronger support as the additional weight
on producer surplus increases since under multilateralism the smaller country does not su¤er
from discrimination (as it does under an FTA) and the tari¤ it faces as an outsider decreases
with .
Figure 4 illustrates equilibrium agreements in the (, ) space to show how the degree of
political economy pressure and endowment asymmetry jointly determine equilibrium outcomes
under bilateralism and multilateralism:
 Figure 4 here 
Note from Figure 4 that free trade is more likely to be stable under bilateralism as 
increases. By contrast, free trade fails to be stable under multilateralism when  is su¢ciently
large ( > 1
10
). Finally, when  > ps(F   ll
0), free trade fails to obtain under both bilateralism
and multilateralism. Under such a case, stable agreements under bilateralism (hfll0gi and
hfslgi) lead to higher global welfare than the one under multilateralism (


fll0
m
g

).
8 Conclusion
One of the striking features of todays global policy landscape is the widespread prevalence
of preferential trade agreements. Only a handful of countries are not involved in one and
most simultaneously participate in several such agreements. Jagdish Bhagwati (1991) famously
raised concern about the potential adverse e¤ects of the pursuit of preferential trade agreements
on the prospects of multilateral trade liberalization. His work led to a rich body of research
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that has illuminated various aspects of the multi-faceted relationship between preferential and
multilateral trade liberalization. However, this literature has often tended to treat bilateral
trade agreements as exogenous or only considered an endogenous trade agreement between a
pair of countries while treating the third country as a silent observer. By contrast, we present
a model in which all countries are free to pursue both bilateral and multilateral agreements.
To determine whether bilateralism hampers or facilitates the obtainment of global free trade,
we also derive stable equilibria under a purely multilateral approach to trade agreements. This
analysis helps shed light on the pros and cons of bilateralism and multilateralism.
A central result of this paper is that bilateralism can actually provide an impetus to mul-
tilateral trade liberalization. The point is that a country that is choosing whether or not to
participate in global free trade must consider its fate under the agreement that would emerge in
the absence of its participation. Due to the fact that a bilateral trade agreement discriminates
against the outsider whereas a multilateral agreement does not, a non participating country is
worse o¤ under the former relative to the latter. As a result, a countrys incentive to opt for
free trade is stronger when the alternative to free trade is a bilateral agreement between the
other two countries as opposed to a multilateral one.
An important implication of our analysis is that to properly account for the role of bilat-
eralism, we need to better understand why countries choose to enter into bilateral agreements
when multilateral trade liberalization is an option. To this end, the model suggests that the
debate regarding preferential versus multilateral liberalization is moot in the absence of some
type of asymmetry across countries. This is because, in our model, whether or not countries
are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements, global free trade is the only stable equilibrium
under symmetry. This result demonstrates that heterogeneity across countries with respect to
the benets that they enjoy from global free trade may be a critical determinant of the success
of a purely multilateral approach to trade liberalization. In our view, such heterogeneity has
received insu¢cient attention in the literature and its role merits further research.
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9 Appendix
This appendix contains supporting calculations and brief proofs of propositions stated in the
paper.
Supporting calculations
We begin by reporting welfare levels under di¤erent policy regimes. Under bilateralism, we
have:
wi(F ) =
[(
P
j
ej
3
)2 +
P
j
(
ej
3
)2]
2
+ ei(2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2ei +
P
j 6=i
ej
3
)
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]2
2
+ (
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P
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3ej
8
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2ek
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4
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P
j 6=i
ej
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"
[
(ej + ek)
3
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X
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[
(2ej + 5ei)
11
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#
+ ei(2 
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P
j 6=i
2ej
11
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wi(jh) =
( ei+ek
3
)2 + (
7ei+ej
11
)2
2
+
(4e2k + 3e
2
j   2ejek)
22
+ ei(2 
32ei + 11ek + 3ej
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)
Under multilateralism, we have:
wi(ij
m) = 2ei +
3(ei + ej)(3ej   13ei)
128
+
(2ei + 3ek)(3ek   12ei) + (3ej + ek)(ej + 5ek)
98
wi(jk
m) = 2ei + (
ej + ek
4
)2 +
(3ei + 2ej)(2ej   11ei) + (3ei + 2ek)(2ek   11ei)
98
Welfare levels under symmetry can be calculated by setting each countrys endowment to e in
28
the formulae above. The relevant comparisons under symmetry are as follows:
wi(ij   ) =
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2
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44
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44
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e
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e
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Proof of Lemma 3
First consider part (i). We know from Lemma 1 that wi(ih   F ) > 0 under symmetry.
Next, note that @wi(ih F )
@ei
=
134(ej+ek) 320ei
332
< 0, @wi(ih F )
@ej
=
134ei 85ej
332
> 0 and @wi(ih F )
@ek
=
134ei 85ek
332
> 0. At ei =
4e
5
and ej = ek = e, we have wi(ih F ) = 3(
e
11
)2 > 0. Using analogous
arguments, we can establish parts (ii) and (iii).
Critical thresholds
Since el = el0 , we must have (F   lh) = (F   l
0h). Furthermore, (F   ll0)s = 1:0398 and
(F   lh)s = 1:1487.
Inequalities from the text
We have
wl(F   sl) j= 5
4
=
7
2
(
e
12
)2 > 0 and
@wl(F   sl)
@
=  
1357   1211
63363
< 0
Proof of Proposition 3a
Note from (9) that under symmetry two countries always benet from forming a bilateral
FTA. Also, we know from Lemma 2b that @wl(ll
0 )
@es
> 0. Next, note that wl(ll
0   ) j= 5
4
=
3
10
( e
8
)2 > 0. This implies that hfgi is not stable:
wl(ll
0   ) > 0 for all  (29)
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Furthermore, inequalities (18) and (29) together imply that
wl(sl   ) > 0 for all  (30)
Consider now the smaller countrys perspective under hfslgi. From Lemma 2a, we know
that @wl(sl )
@es
> 0. Further note that ws(sl   ) j= 5
4
= 719
2
( e
440
)2 > 0. This implies
ws(sl   ) > 0 for all  (31)
It is immediate from (20) that the two larger countries jointly defect from hfshgi to hfFgi
and this defection is self-enforcing since neither has an incentive to further defect (Lemma 5).
Thus, hfshgi is not stable. Similarly, the smaller country defects unilaterally from hflhgi to
hfll0gi so that hflhgi is not stable.25
Next, we provide conditions under which hfslgi and hfll0gi are stable. There exist ve
possible coalitional deviations from hfslgi:
(JSL1): Deviation of l and l0 from hfslgi to hfll0gi.
(JSL2): Deviation of s and l0 from hfslgi to hfshgi.
(JSL3): Deviation of l and l0 from hfslgi to hflhgi.
(JSL4): Deviation of all countries from hfslgi to hfl0hgi.
(JSL5): Deviation of all countries from hfslgi to hfFgi.
Note from (18) that country l will not defect from hfslgi to hfll0gi. Thus, JSL1 is ruled out.
Next consider JSL2 and JSL3. We know from Lemma 3 that country s (l) has an incentive to
defect from hfslgi to hfshgi (hflhgi). For these deviations to occur, the choice of country l
0
is
pivotal. We have
wl0(sh  sl)  0 i¤   l0(sh  sl) = 1:0639 (32)
and
wl0(lh  sl)  0 i¤   l0(lh  sl) = 1:0629 (33)
25An analogous discussion applies to hfl0hgi.
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Since   l0(lh  sl) > l0(sh  sl), JSL3 is the binding deviation.
Now consider JSL4. Since the smaller country has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from
hfl0hgi to hfll0gi, even if JSL4 occurs, it is not self-enforcing. Finally, we know from (23) that
JSL5 occurs when  < s(F   lh) and it is self enforcing only if  < s(F   ll
0
). Thus, hfslgi
is stable i¤ l0(lh  sl)    s(F   ll
0).
We now derive conditions under which hfll0gi is stable. Inequality (29) implies that there
can be no deviations from hfll0gi to hfgi. Now consider the following coalitional deviations:
(JLL1): Deviation of s and l from hfll0gi to hfslgi.
(JLL2): Deviation of s and l from hfll0gi to hflhgi.
(JLL3): Deviation of all countries from hfll0gi to hfshgi.
(JLL4): Deviation of all countries from hfll0gi to hfFgi.
From Lemma 3, it is immediate that JLL1 is not a self-enforcing deviation since country
l has an incentive to further deviate to hflhgi : Moreover, JLL2 is ruled out since country s
does not have an incentive to defect from hfll0gi to hflhgi. We also know from (20) that even
if JLL3 occurs, the two larger countries further deviate from hfshgi to hfFgi. Thus the initial
deviation is not self-enforcing. Finally, (23) implies that all countries deviate from hfll0gi to
hfFgi when  < s(F   ll
0) and this deviation is self-enforcing. Thus, hfll0gi is stable i¤
  s(F   ll
0).
Other inequalities from the text
We have ws(F   ll
0m)  0 i¤   s(F   ll
0m) = 1:0149: Furthermore,
@ww(sl   ll0
m
)
@
=  
8605 + 1949
2
(
e
308
)2 < 0
Note that when  = l0(lh   sl), ww(sl   ll
0m) > 0. Thus, ww(sl   ll0
m
) > 0 when
s(F   ll
0)   < l0(lh  sl).
Other calculations
ws(F   ) = (
e
24
)2
51  252   2
2
> 0 for all 
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ws(F   ss
0)  0 i¤   s(F   ss
0) = 1:0845
ws(F   s
0l)  0 i¤   s(F   s
0l) = 1:0810
ws(F   s
0h)  0 i¤   (F   s0h)s = 1:1814
Proof of Proposition 5
wi(F   ) =
e2(8 + 1)
48
> 0;wi(F   jk) =
176 + 13
3
(
e
22
)2 > 0;
wi(F   ij) =
616 + 101
6
(
e
44
)2 > 0;wi(F   jh) =
132 + 29
2
(
e
33
)2 > 0
wi(F   jk) =
(18 + 1)(1  10)
3
(
e
14
)2  0 i¤  
1
10
Proof of Proposition 6
Part (i) is immediate from the fact that ps(F   ll
0) < ps(F   ll
0m) for all feasible .
Parts (ii) and (iii): The following is immediate from the proof proposition 3a
wl(ll
0   ) > 0, wl(sl   ) > 0, and ws(sl   ) > 0 for all ,  (34)
These inequalities imply that hfgi is not stable.
We know from (20) that two larger countries jointly defect from hfshgi to hfFgi when
 = 0. This defection also occurs for any  > 0 and is self-enforcing since neither country has
an incentive to further defect. Therefore, hfshgi is not stable.
Now consider hflhgi.26 The smaller country defects from hflhgi to hfll0gi unless  
ps(lh  ll
0) where ps(lh  ll
0) is dened by ws(lh  ll
0) = 0. However, when   ps(lh  ll
0),
the joint deviation of countries s and l0 from hflhgi to hfFgi is self-enforcing so that hflhgi
fails to be stable.
Next consider hfslgi and hfll0gi. We know from (34) that unilateral defections from hfslgi
to hfgi and hfll0gi to hfgi do not occur. There exist ve possible coalitional deviations
from hfslgi:
26An analogous discussion applies to hfl0hgi.
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(JSL1-P): Deviation of l and l0 from hfslgi to hfll0gi.
(JSL2-P): Deviation of s and l0 from hfslgi to hfshgi.
(JSL3-P): Deviation of l and l0 from hfslgi to hflhgi.
(JSL4-P): Deviation of all countries from hfslgi to hfl0hgi.
(JSL5-P): Deviation of all countries from hfslgi to hfFgi.
JSL1-P is ruled out since country l does not defect from hfslgi to hfll0gi. Next consider
JSL2-P and JSL3-P. We know from Lemma 3 that country s (l) has an incentive to defect from
hfslgi to hfshgi (hflhgi). For these deviations to occur, the choice of country l
0
is pivotal. We
have wl0(sh   sl)  0 i¤   
p
l0(sh   sl) and wl0(lh   sl)  0 i¤   
p
l0(lh   sl). Since
l0(lh  sl)  l0(sh  sl) JSL3-P is the binding deviation.
Next note that since country l has no incentive to deviate from hfslgi to hfl0hgi, JSL4-
P does not occur. Finally, note that the two larger countries have an incentive to jointly
deviate from hfslgi to hfFgi whereas the smaller country defects only when it has a relatively
symmetric endowment ws(F   sl)  0 i¤   
p
s(F   sl) and and this joint deviation is self
enforcing only if  < ps(F   ll
0
). Thus, hfslgi is stable i¤ ps(F   ll
0)    pl0(lh  sl).
For hfll0gi to be stable, we need to consider the following coalitional deviations:
(JLL1-P): Deviation of s and l from hfll0gi to hfslgi.
(JLL2-P): Deviation of s and l from hfll0gi to hflhgi.
(JLL3-P): Deviation of all countries from hfll0gi to hfshgi.
(JLL4-P): Deviation of all countries from hfll0gi to hfFgi.
Note that JLL1-P is not a self-enforcing deviation since country l has an incentive to further
deviate to hflhgi and JLL2-P happens only when  < ps(lh  ll
0) and that it is a self-enforcing
deviation. Even if JLL3-P occurs, the larger countries further deviate from hfshgi to hfFgi,
making the initial deviation not self-enforcing. Finally, all countries deviate from hfll0gi to
hfFgi when  < ps(F   ll
0) and this deviation is self-enforcing. Since ps(lh  ll
0) < ps(F   ll
0),
hfll0gi is stable i¤   ps(F   ll
0).
Under multilateralism, straightforward calculations show that (i)wl(ll
0m ); (ii)wl(F 
) > 0; (iii) wl0(F   sl
m
) > 0; and (iv) ws(F   ll
0m)  0 i¤   ps(F   ll
0m).
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Figure 2: Stable agreements under multilateralism
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Figure 3: Bilateralism versus multilateralism
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Figure 4: Political Economy considerations and bilateralism versus multilateralism
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